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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Federal-Mogul Global and its affiliates filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought to resolve asbestos-related 
liability through the creation of a personal-injury trust under 
11 U.S.C. § 524(g).1
                                              
1 Besides the Reorganized-Debtors Federal-Mogul, there are 
two additional Appellees: the Official Committee of Asbestos 
Claimants and the Legal Representative for Future Asbestos 
  As part of its reorganization plan, it 
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sought to transfer rights under insurance liability policies to 
the trust.  Appellants Insurers2
I. 
 had provided liability policies 
to the debtors prior to bankruptcy and objected that the 
transfer violated the policies’ anti-assignment provisions.  
Federal-Mogul contended that 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(B) 
preempts those provisions, and the bankruptcy and district 
courts agreed.  We will affirm. 
A. 
                                                                                                     
Claimants.  For the sake of brevity, we will refer to the 
Appellees collectively as “Federal-Mogul.” 
2 Appellants are five groups of insurers: (1) Hartford Accident 
and Indemnity Company, First State Insurance Company, and 
New England Insurance Company; (2) Allianz Global 
Corporate & Specialty AG, Allianz Global Risks U.S. 
Insurance Company (formerly known as Allianz Insurance 
Company), and Allianz Underwriters Insurance Company 
(formerly known as Allianz Underwriters, Inc.); (3) Columbia 
Casualty Company, Continental Casualty Company, and the 
Continental Insurance Company (both in its individual 
capacity and as successor to certain interests of Harbor 
Insurance Company); (4) Fireman’s Fund Insurance 
Company and National Surety Company; and (5) Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London and Certain London Market 
Companies.    Briefs were filed on behalf of the first four 
groups under the caption “Certain Appellants,” and on behalf 
of the fifth under the caption “London Market Insurers” 
(“LMI”). We refer to Appellants collectively as “Insurers.”  
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 For almost two decades, Chapter 11 bankruptcies have 
employed a statutory mechanism created by 11 U.S.C. § 
524(g) to resolve massive asbestos liability and to evaluate 
claims and allocate payments to current and future asbestos 
claimants.  When this provision’s requirements are satisfied, 
the bankruptcy court may issue an injunction channeling all 
current and future claims based on the debtor’s asbestos 
liability to a personal injury trust.  This case centers on these 
trusts. 
The salience of § 524(g) trusts stems from the ongoing 
dilemma of asbestos liability, “the longest-running mass tort 
litigation in the United States.”  Stephen J. Carroll et al., 
RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Asbestos Litigation 21-24 
(2005).3
                                              
3 By the end of 2002, over 730,000 claimants had sought 
relief from over 8,400 defendants.  Carroll, supra, at 70-79.  
More recent data demonstrates that asbestos filings peaked in 
2003 and have fallen significantly since then, with the annual 
number of filings at around 20% of 2001 levels.  Mary 
Elizabeth C. Stern et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Snapshot 
of Recent Trends in Asbestos Litigation: 2011 Update fig. 1 
(2011), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-
files/PUB_Recent_Trends_Asbestos_Litigation_0711.pdf.  
The number of pending claims has also fallen  below 2001 
levels after peaking mid-decade, while the value of each 
resolved claim rose, likely due to a larger proportion of 
malignant over non-malignant claims.  Id. at 4-7. 
  As courts and commentators have noted, a just and 
efficient resolution of asbestos claims has often eluded the 
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traditional tort system.4
                                              
4 Asbestos liability has also fit poorly into the usual dynamics 
of insurance coverage.  While the dangers of asbestos were 
becoming known when insurers drafted comprehensive 
general liability policies in the 1950s and 1960s, they likely 
did not foresee the rise of enormous mass tort liability 
decades later.  See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Maze of Mega-
Coverage Litigation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2102, 2105 (1997).  
Written on an injury- or occurrence-basis, the policies were 
ill-fitted to address long-latency diseases based on prolonged 
exposure.  Id.  Courts interpreted the policies’ coverage 
language to impose a “continuous trigger” of insurance 
coverage for asbestos liability, holding that every policy on 
the risk between first exposure to manifestation—often a 
period of decades—was triggered.  See Keene Corp. v. Ins. 
Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042-47 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure 
Tort Claims: The Debate over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 
45 Drake L. Rev. 625, 646-50 (1997) (summarizing the 
development and justifications for the continuous trigger of 
coverage).   
   See In re Congoleum Corp., 426 
F.3d 675, 693 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 
The result of the continuous trigger rule has been the 
apportionment of liability among numerous insurers, often 
posing difficult questions of allocation and likely 
incentivizing policyholders to file suit against all insurers 
who sold them coverage during the trigger period.  Abraham, 
supra, at 2106-07.  Further complicating the situation is the 
distorting effect of multiple insurance layers on insurers’ 
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391 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Richard A. 
Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement x-xiii (2007). 
The aggregate pressure of such claims has led to a variety of 
quasi-administrative approaches to asbestos liability,5
                                                                                                     
incentives.  Primary insurers had the duty to defend against 
claims that exceeded their policy limits, so they allegedly 
minimized defense costs by rushing into aggregate 
settlements that included claims of dubious value while 
passing the settlements’ cost onto excess insurers.  Richard A. 
Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 27-28 (2007); 
Michelle J. White, Why the Asbestos Genie Won’t Stay in the 
Bankruptcy Bottle, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1319, 1334-36 (2002). 
 but 
5 Both courts and corporations have attempted to implement 
innovative solutions to remedy the perceived deficiencies of 
the tort system to address the flood of asbestos claims, but 
these have proved unsuccessful because of the limitations on 
the powers of courts and of private parties.  In the Eastern 
District of Texas, Judge Robert Parker sought to implement a 
three-part trial procedure for addressing three thousand 
asbestos claims by using statistical sampling and test trials to 
create a compensation grid that would be extrapolated to all 
pending claims.  Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. 
Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).  This plan was overturned on 
appeal for violating the defendants’ Seventh Amendment 
rights.  Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th 
Cir. 1998).  Owens Corning, a major asbestos manufacturer, 
sought to create a “National Settlement Program” outside the 
judicial system by entering private contracts with plaintiffs’ 
firms that would have settled the claims of the firms’ clients 
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Congress has yet to create the “national asbestos dispute-
resolution scheme” requested by the Supreme Court, Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (citing 
Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Judicial 
Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 3, 27-
35 (1991)); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 
821 & n.1 (1999).6
A consequence of the failure to create a 
comprehensive resolution to asbestos litigation has been a 
reliance on the Bankruptcy Code to provide some 
  Initial attempts to employ the class action 
device to resolve the claims of present and future asbestos 
victims failed to adequately protect the interests of absent 
class members.  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-28; Ortiz, 527 U.S. 
at 848-59.  
                                                                                                     
based on an administrative grid.  Nagareda, supra, 108-13.  
But Owens Corning could not create a universal binding 
system through private contract, and so the innovation failed.  
Id.  The company filed for bankruptcy, creating a § 524(g) 
trust to address its asbestos liability.  Id.  
6 Various alternatives have been proposed in Congress, 
including several proposals along the lines of the 
administrative scheme adopted for black lung compensation, 
but they have not been enacted.  See U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, GAO-11-819, Asbestos Injury 
Compensation: The Role and Administration of Asbestos 
Trusts app’x I (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11819.pdf (summarizing 
congressional proposals to address asbestos litigation since 
1973). 
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predictability and regularity in addressing mass tort liability.  
Bankruptcy has proven an attractive alternative to the tort 
system for corporations because it permits a global resolution 
and discharge of current and future liability, while claimants’ 
interests are protected by the bankruptcy court’s power to use 
future earnings to compensate similarly situated tort claimants 
equitably.  S. Elizabeth Gibson, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Judicial 
Management of Mass Tort Bankruptcy Cases 1-2 (2005).  The 
primary bankruptcy innovation for addressing mass tort 
liability has been the post-confirmation trust, which first 
appeared in the bankruptcy proceedings of the Johns-
Manville Corporation, the largest producer of asbestos-
containing products.  Lloyd Dixon et al., RAND Inst. for 
Civil Justice, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts: An Overview of 
Trust Structure and Activity with Detailed Reports on the 
Largest Trusts 5 (2010) [hereinafter RAND Trust Report].  In 
that case, the bankruptcy court issued a channeling injunction 
under 11 U.S.C. § 105 requiring future asbestos claims be 
brought against a trust created to compensate victims, and 
barring actions against the reorganized debtor, its 
subsidiaries, or any settling insurance company.7
                                              
7 Initially, the Johns-Manville trust paid claimants the full 
value of their claims.  RAND Trust Report, supra, at 5-6.  The 
number of claims quickly exceeded projections, and in 1995 
the trust was reorganized to pay less than the full value of 
claims, to give priority to seriously-ill claimants, and to create 
an administrative role for a representative to protect future 
claimants’ interests.  Id. 
  In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 624-28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), 
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aff’d, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d sub nom. Kane v. 
Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 
636 (2d Cir. 1988).    
Congress codified the Johns-Manville trust mechanism 
as a “creative solution to help protect . . . future asbestos 
claimants,” H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 47 (1994), reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3348, in the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, § 111, 108 Stat. 4106, 4113-17 
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)-(h)).  Congress intended the 
trusts as a means to give “full consideration” to the interests 
of future claimants by ensuring their claims would be 
compensated comparably to present claims, while 
simultaneously enabling corporations saddled with asbestos 
liability to obtain the “fresh start” promised by bankruptcy.8
                                              
8 As one senator described it, § 524(g) “affirm[s] what 
Chapter 11 reorganization is supposed to be about: allowing 
an otherwise viable business to quantify, consolidate, and 
manage its debt so that it can satisfy its creditors to the 
maximum extent feasible, but without threatening its 
continued existence and the thousands of jobs that it 
provides.”  140 Cong. Rec. 28,358 (1994) (statement of Sen. 
Brown).         
   
H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 46-48.  To achieve these goals and 
“protect the due process rights of future claimants,” section 
524(g) imposed “many statutory prerequisites” that must be 
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satisfied before a channeling injunction may issue.9
As of May 2011, there were fifty-six asbestos 
personal-injury trusts, with several more in process.  Lloyd 
Dixon & Geoffrey McGovern, RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, 
Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts and Tort Compensation 1 n.1 
(2011).  Through 2010, the trusts have paid about 3.3 million 
claims valued at roughly $17.5 billion.  U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, supra, at 16.  There is substantial 
similarity among the various trusts in structure and function.  
Nearly all the trusts are governed by trustees who manage 
financial affairs, while a committee of advocates, consisting 
of representatives of current and future claimants, must 
approve substantial trust activities.
  
Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234 n.45. 
10
                                              
9 Under the law, the bankruptcy court may grant a channeling 
injunction only if (1) the debtor is subject to substantial and 
uncertain future asbestos liability, (2) the trust owns a 
majority of the voting shares of the debtor or corporate 
parent, (3) seventy-five percent of current claimants vote to 
approve the plan, and (4) the trust operates through 
mechanisms that assure the plan will pay “present claims and 
future demands . . . in substantially the same manner.”  11 
U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B).  The injunction may bind future 
claimants only if a future claims representative is appointed 
during the reorganization and the bankruptcy court 
determines the injunction is “fair and equitable” with respect 
to future claimants.  Id. § 524(g)(4)(B). 
  RAND Trust Report, 
10 Although there are usually more representatives of current 
than future claimants, they possess equal authority and must 
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supra, at 11-14.  Moreover, like the Johns-Manville trust on 
which they are modeled,11
                                                                                                     
both consent to substantial modifications of the trust.  RAND 
Trust Report, supra, at 13-14. 
 asbestos personal-injury trusts 
receive funding from three primary sources: debtor cash, 
debtor stock, and insurance settlements.  See id. at app. B 
(categorizing the initial funding of the 26 largest asbestos 
trusts as “Cash from debtor(s),” “Stock from debtors(s) [sic],” 
“Insurance settlements,” or “Other assets”).  While some 
trusts have been funded primarily with an initial infusion of 
cash from the debtor, id. at 65, 105, 137, and others have 
consisted primarily of funds obtained from insurance, id. at 
55, 79, 115, 123, most rely on a mix of assets.  Finally, all 
trusts have Trust Distribution Protocols (TDPs) to govern 
11 When drafting § 524(g), Congress observed that the Johns-
Manville trust was funded “through stock of the emerging 
debtor company and a portion of future profits, along with 
contributions from Johns-Manville’s insurers.”  H.R. Rep. 
No. 103-835, at 47.  The insurers’ contributions to the Johns-
Manville trust consisted of a negotiated settlement with 
Johns-Manville following protracted litigation.  The insurers 
ultimately agreed to pay $770 million in return for injunctive 
protection against all future claims.  MacArthur Co. v. Johns-
Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 90 
(2d Cir. 1988).  This funding constituted “most of the initial 
corpus of the Trust,” and was considered the “cornerstone of 
the Manville reorganization.”  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 
557 U.S. 137, ----, 129 S. Ct. 2195, 2199 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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how claims are processed and compensated.12
                                              
12 TDP procedures are similar across most trusts, including 
the Federal-Mogul trust.  Claimants generally select between 
expedited or individual review.  RAND Trust Report, supra, 
at 15.  Under expedited review, a claimant presents evidence 
to satisfy pre-established medical and exposure criteria.  Id. at 
17-19.  Once met, the claim is liquidated according to a 
compensation grid based on eight disease levels that provide 
the highest payment to those suffering from mesothelioma 
and other malignant diseases.  Id.  If a claimant seeks 
individual review—mandated when medical and exposure 
criteria are not satisfied, but also used to assess whether 
special circumstances might warrant greater compensation—
the processing facility determines whether the claim would be 
compensable in the tort system, with valuation based on 
historical tort awards for similarly situated plaintiffs.  Id. at 
19-20.  In the event of a dispute, claims are submitted to 
nonbinding arbitration, or, if that fails, to the courts, although 
such resolutions are reportedly rare.  Id. at 21.  Finally, after 
valuation, claims are paid based on a payment percentage on 
a first-in-first-out basis, subject to an annual cap on total 
compensation and, in some trusts, a claim ratio that reserves a 
certain percentage of annual compensation to claimants with 
the most serious diseases.  Id. at 21-22.  Under the TDPs, few 
trusts pay the full value of submitted claims: current payment 
percentages range widely, but the median is 25%, with most 
   These 
procedures are approved as part of the bankruptcy 
reorganization plan but may later be modified.   Id. at 14. 
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As a quasi-administrative scheme, § 524(g) trusts have 
drawn considerable commentary.13  While Congress sought to 
protect the interests of current claimants by requiring that 
75% of them approve the trust, some have suggested that this 
provision, without the “cram down” otherwise available in 
bankruptcy, grants plaintiffs’ attorneys a de facto veto over 
reorganization, allowing them to leverage concessions at the 
expense of other stakeholders.14
                                                                                                     
trusts paying between ten and forty-six percent of a claim’s 
liquidated value.  Id. tbl. 4.4. 
  S. Todd Brown, Section 
13 See, e.g., Todd R. Snyder & Deanne C. Siemer, Asbestos 
Pre-Packaged Bankruptcies: Apply the Brakes Carefully and 
Retain Flexibility for Debtors, 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 
801 (2005); Ronald Barliant et al., From Free-Fall to Free-
for-All: The Rise of Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 441 (2004); Mark D. Plevin et al., 
Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 
S. Tex. L. Rev. 883 (2003). 
14 Another significant question that has received attention is 
the relationship between tort and trust compensation, which 
are linked in complex ways that vary from state to state.  See 
Dixon & McGovern, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts and Tort 
Compensation, supra, at 3-7 (outlining the linkages between 
the trusts and tort claims).  Some have contended that the 
confidentiality of the trust system allows claimants to 
“double-dip” in both the tort and trust system and permits 
reliance on dubious medical reports, while others have 
disagreed with this assessment.  See How Fraud and Abuse in 
the Asbestos Compensation System Affect Victims, Jobs, the 
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524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the Asbestos 
Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 841, 856-70; 
cf. In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d at 680 & n.4 (noting 
that, in the absence of a cramdown provision, “[t]he realities 
of securing favorable votes from thousands of claimants to 
meet the 75% approval requirement [in 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)] 
forc[e] debtors to work closely with the few attorneys who 
represent large numbers of injured claimants.”).  Others 
criticize the voting procedure because it allows the more 
numerous holders of small claims to outvote those with 
mesothelioma and other serious injuries, who, unlike in a 
class action settlement, cannot opt out of the trust mechanism.  
See Nagareda, supra, at 20-21, 171-73.  Our case law has 
acknowledged some of these concerns.  In Combustion 
Engineering, we held that the use of a two-trust structure that 
granted current asbestos claimants “privileged treatment” 
prior to voting on the reorganization plan may have lacked 
both the “good faith” and “indicia of support” among 
creditors required by the Bankruptcy Code, as well as likely 
contravening the constitutional guarantee of procedural due 
process.  391 F.3d at 244-47.  We also noted that the apparent 
preferential treatment granted to slightly impaired claimants 
                                                                                                     
Economy, and the Legal System: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (presenting testimony on both 
sides of this question); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 
supra, at 29-33 (summarizing differing views and various 
proposals on whether and how trust claimant information 
should be made available to outside parties) . 
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was “especially problematic in the asbestos context, where a 
voting majority can be made to consist of non-malignant 
claimants whose interests may be adverse to those of 
claimants with more severe injuries.”  Id. at 244.  A later case 
presented an allegation “of collusion between [the debtor] and 
the asbestos’ claimants counsel” suggesting that the debtor 
had “sold out . . . insurers by setting up a system in which 
they would pay newly ginned-up silica claims in exchange for 
the asbestos claimants casting their votes in favor of the 
[Reorganization] Plan.”  In re Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 
F.3d 201, 214 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  We characterized this 
assertion as a “profoundly serious charge . . . not without 
record support.”  Id.   
Unlike in our earlier cases, these issues are not 
properly before us.  Conflicts of interest or other procedural 
and structural deficiencies are properly raised in proceedings 
to confirm the reorganization plan.  Nevertheless, London 
Market Insurers contend the plan here did not satisfy the 
confirmation requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) because the 
debtor employed complicated financial maneuvers to avoid 
adequate trust funding.  But no objection was raised before 
the bankruptcy court in the confirmation proceedings, and we 
decline to entertain a collateral attack on a final, non-
appealable judgment.  Moreover, none of the parties here 
allege, nor does the record provide, evidence of collusion of 
the sort that was so troubling in Combustion Engineering and 
Global Technologies.   
Furthermore, the trusts appear to have fulfilled 
Congress’s expectation that they would serve the interests of 
19 
 
both current and future asbestos claimants and corporations 
saddled with asbestos liability.  In particular, observers have 
noted the trusts’ effectiveness in remedying some of the 
intractable pathologies of asbestos litigation, especially given 
the continued lack of a viable alternative providing a just and 
comprehensive resolution.  Empirical research suggests the 
trusts considerably reduce transaction costs and attorneys’ 
fees over comparable rates in the tort system.  Compare 
RAND Trust Report, supra, at xiv & n. 1 (citing evidence that 
the claimants received 95% of trust expenditures, while 
limiting attorneys’ contingent fees at around 25%), with 
Carroll, supra, at 98-103 (determining that in the tort system 
claimants ultimately received 42% of total spending on 
asbestos litigation, with contingency fee rates averaging 34% 
of claimants’ recoveries), and Judicial Conference of the 
U.S., supra, at 3, 12-14 (noting that transaction costs in 
asbestos litigation exceeded victims’ recoveries by nearly two 
to one).  Recently, the trusts have required more rigorous 
medical evidence, and significantly reduced the valuation for  
non-malignant claims.  Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution 
of Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust Distribution Plans, 62 N.Y.U. 
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 163, 171-74 (2006).  Others have stressed 
that problems over the difficulty of reconciling competing 
interests of present and future claimants are not limited to the 
creation of § 524(g) trusts, but extend to the current state of 
asbestos and mass tort litigation generally.  See Nagareda, 
supra, at 182 (observing that the “challenge”  raised in 
Combustion Engineering of setting terms for both present and 
future claimants “is not limited to the bankruptcy context but . 
. . forms the fundamental problem posed by any peace 
20 
 
arrangement for mass tort litigation.”).  Nevertheless, we 
leave such systemic public policy questions to Congress.   
In sum, section 524 trusts are the only national 
statutory scheme extant to resolve asbestos litigation through 
a quasi-administrative process.  In function, the trusts are 
similar to workers’ compensation or other administrative 
remedies that employ valuation grids to compensate injuries, 
subject to individualized and judicial review.  Unlike those 
schemes, the trusts place the authority to adjudicate claims in 
private rather than public hands, a difference that has at times 
given us and other observers pause, since it endows 
potentially interested parties with considerable authority.   
With this context, we turn to the specific facts of this 
case.  
B. 
On October 1, 2001, Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., one 
of the world’s largest manufacturers of automobile parts, and 
over 150 affiliates filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions in 
the District of Delaware.  The principal purpose of the 
petitions was the resolution of Federal-Mogul’s enormous 
asbestos-related liabilities.  The company alleges that 500,000 
personal-injury claims were pending on the petition date, with 
many more anticipated in the future, and asserts it expended 
over $350 million in the preceding year defending and 
indemnifying asbestos claims.  See generally In re Federal-
Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 372-73 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(describing the origins of the Federal-Mogul bankruptcy and 
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the “[t]ens of thousands” of asbestos claims against the debtor 
at issue on appeal). 
In its proposed plan for reorganization, Federal-Mogul 
sought to obtain an injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) to 
channel present and future asbestos-related claims to a post-
confirmation trust.  The plan assigned various assets to the 
trust, including Federal-Mogul’s rights to recovery under 
liability insurance.  The plan also contained “insurance 
neutrality” provisions granting insurers the right to assert 
against the trust any defense to coverage already available 
under the policies, excepting only the defense that the transfer 
to the trust violated the policies’ anti-assignment provisions. 
Insurers here had issued liability policies to Federal-
Mogul prior to bankruptcy.  They objected to the plan’s 
confirmation, asserting the plan violated the policies’ anti-
assignment provisions—standard clauses in liability policies 
that bar the insured from transferring the policies or insurance 
rights without the insurers’ consent.  See 2 Lee R. Russ, 
Couch on Insurance § 34:25 (3d ed. 2011).  Federal-Mogul 
argued the anti-assignment provisions were preempted under 
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(B), which provides that a Chapter 11 
reorganization plan shall provide adequate means for its 
implementation, potentially including transfer of estate 
property, “notwithstanding otherwise applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”  The parties agreed to bifurcate the 
proceedings and resolve this issue separately, with the right to 
appeal the bankruptcy court’s preemption judgment.  On 
November 8, 2007, with all other objections resolved, the 
Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan of reorganization, and 
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the District Court affirmed.  The plan went into effect on 
December 27, 2007. 
On March 19, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court issued its 
Preemption Order and Memorandum Opinion, holding the 
Bankruptcy Code preempted the anti-assignment provisions 
within the insurers’ policies.  In re Federal-Mogul Global 
Inc., 385 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).   It reasoned that 11 
U.S.C. § 541 permitted the assignment of the insurance rights 
to the bankruptcy estate, and 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) allowed 
transfer of the rights to the § 524(g) trust.  Id. at 566-67 
(citing In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 219 & n.27).  It 
also relied on state insurance-law doctrine that assignment 
after the occurrence giving rise to liability does not violate 
anti-assignment provisions, since “there will be no additional 
risk to the insurance companies by virtue of the assignments.”  
Id. at 567-71.  The court also rejected a number of the 
insurers’ contentions, holding that the presumption against 
preemption was inapplicable given the plain meaning of § 
1123(a), that the preemptive scope of § 1123(a)(5) reaches 
private contracts, and that the asbestos insurance policies 
were not executory contracts subject to 11 U.S.C. § 365.  Id. 
at 571-76. 
The District Court affirmed.  In re Federal-Mogul 
Global, 402 B.R. 625 (D. Del 2009).  The Court first 
determined that the “notwithstanding” clause in § 1123(a) 
evinced clear congressional intent to expressly preempt 
conflicting state law.  Id. at 631-32.  It then turned to the 
scope of preemption, declining to entertain the insurers’ 
various arguments to distinguish the holding in Combustion 
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Engineering and agreeing with the Bankruptcy Court that the 
case was dispositive on the question of whether § 1123(a) 
preempted insurance policies’ anti-assignment provisions.  Id. 
at 632-38.  Although the court believed that this conclusion 
“effectively ends the matter,” it went on to address insurers’ 
statutory interpretation claims.  Id. at 638.  It distinguished as 
contrary to circuit precedent and plain statutory meaning a 
Ninth Circuit holding, rooted in legislative history, that 
limited the scope of § 1123(a) to that of a similar clause in 11 
U.S.C. § 1142(a) preempting only nonbankruptcy law 
“relating to financial condition.”  Id. at 640-44 (citing Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cal. ex. rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic 
Substances Control, 350 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003)).  Turning 
to the “parade of horribles” the insurers claimed would ensue 
from a broad preemptive reading,15
                                              
15 The insurers alleged that a broad reading of § 1123(a) 
“would allow selling liquor to minors, trading with foreign 
enemies, dumping toxic wastes, retaining unlawful controlled 
substances such as drugs or explosives, or creating 
monopolies—all in contravention to federal or state laws.”  In 
re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 402 B.R. at 642. 
 the Court dismissed them 
as speculative and declined to construct a limiting principle 
when the relief sought fell “within the heartland of 1123(a).”  
Id. at 642-44 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf 
Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 341-342 (2002)).  The court 
concluded by noting that the assignment of the insurance 
policies was consistent with public policy, since the contrary 
result would grant the insurers a windfall because “debtors 
with sizeable insurance assets could never avail themselves of 
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the very trust meant to alleviate” crushing asbestos liability.  
Id. at 644-45. 
Certain Appellants and London Market Insurers timely 
appealed, and we consolidated their appeals.16
                                              
16 We have jurisdiction over final judgments of a district court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and over district court judgments on 
appeal from a bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).  
We review the bankruptcy court’s order using the same 
standard the district court applies.  In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 
F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2000).  The scope of preemption 
presents a pure question of law, which we review de novo.  
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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II. 
“It is a familiar and well-established principle that the 
Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates 
state laws that ‘interfere with, or are contrary to,’ federal 
law.”  Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., 
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)).  State law may be preempted 
“by express language in a congressional enactment, by 
implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional 
scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by implication 
because of a conflict with a congressional enactment.”  
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) 
(citations omitted).  
Two foundational principles of preemption 
jurisprudence inform our analysis.   First, in every preemption 
case, “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone,” 
which “primarily is discerned from the language of the pre-
emption statute and the statutory framework surrounding it,” 
as well as from “the structure and purpose of the statute as a 
whole.”  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86 
(1996) (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in 
original).  Second, we begin with a “presumption against pre-
emption” rooted in the respect for states as independent 
sovereigns in our federal system.  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 
555, 565 n.3 (2009).  This presumption operates most 
forcefully when Congress legislates “in a field which the 
States have traditionally occupied,” particularly “regulation of 
matters of health and safety.”  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  
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This “strong presumption against inferring Congressional 
preemption” also applies “in the bankruptcy context.”  
Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Serv. Support Specialists, Inc., 
124 F.3d 487, 493 (3d Cir. 1997).  The presumption may be 
overcome, however, where “a Congressional purpose to 
preempt . . . is clear and manifest.”  Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 
F.3d 97, 117 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 365 
(2011) (quoting Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 
F.3d 237, 249 (3d Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
A. 
 Insurers contend the disputed issue is one of first 
impression.  Federal-Mogul argues, and the Bankruptcy and 
District Courts agreed, that our opinion in Combustion 
Engineering, 391 F.3d 190, determined that § 1123(a)(5) 
preempts anti-assignment provisions that would otherwise bar 
the transfer of insurance rights to a § 524(g) trust. 
Like the present case, Combustion Engineering arose 
from the bankruptcy proceedings of a corporation that sought 
to channel asbestos-related liabilities to a § 524(g) trust 
funded in part through insurance.  391 F.3d at 204-07.  As 
here, various of the debtor’s insurers claimed assignment to 
the trust would violate the terms of their policies.  Id. at 208.  
Unlike here, the plan at issue in Combustion Engineering 
involved the participation of non-debtor affiliates in the trust 
in return for a bar against asbestos claims, a provision we 
ultimately determined exceeded the scope of the bankruptcy 
court’s jurisdiction.  Id. at 227-38. 
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The preemption of anti-assignment provisions was not 
one of the paramount issues on appeal, id. at 202, but the 
question was raised in the proceedings below and the parties’ 
briefs, and we discussed it briefly in a section on the appellate 
standing of London Market Insurers to challenge the 
reorganization plan.  We held that, “[w]ith respect to the anti-
assignment provisions, we agree with the District Court that 
even if the subject insurance policies purported to prohibit 
assignment of Combustion Engineering’s insurance proceeds, 
these provisions would not prevent the assignment of 
proceeds to the bankruptcy estate.”  Combustion Eng’g, 391 
F.3d at 218.  In a footnote, we expanded: 
Section 541 effectively preempts any 
contractual provision that purports to limit or 
restrict the rights of a debtor to transfer or 
assigns [sic] its interest in bankruptcy.  11 
U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (“[A]n interest of the debtor 
in property becomes property of the estate . . . 
notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, 
transfer instrument, or applicable 
nonbankruptcy law—(A) that restricts or 
conditions transfer of such interest by the 
debtor”).  The Bankruptcy Code expressly 
contemplates the inclusion of debtor insurance 
policies in the bankruptcy estate.  Section 
1123(a)(5) provides: 
Notwithstanding any otherwise 
applicable nonbankruptcy law, a 
plan shall-  
...  
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(5) provide adequate means for 
the plan’s implementation, such 
as  
...  
(B) transfer of all or any part of 
property of the estate to one or 
more entities, whether organized 
before or after the confirmation of 
such plan. 
  
Id. at 218 n.27.   
This statement is clearer in context.  There was no 
dispute over whether Combustion Engineering could transfer 
its insurance rights to the bankruptcy estate, a right well-
established under circuit law at the time.  See Estate of 
Lellock v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 811 F.2d 186, 189 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (“We hold that an insurance policy is property of 
the estate within 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).”).  Rather, as we 
noted elsewhere in the opinion, the assignment issue hinged 
on whether Combustion Engineering could “contribute its 
rights to proceeds under certain insurance policies” to “the 
Asbestos PI Trust.”  Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 206; see 
also id. at 216 (“The Bankruptcy Court found the assignment 
of insurance proceeds to the Asbestos PI Trust did not impair 
the rights of insurers.”).   Further context comes from our 
stated agreement with the district court on this issue, since 
that court had held that the anti-assignment provisions did not 
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bar transfer to the trust.17
As this context demonstrates, the question we 
addressed in Combustion Engineering was the same we 
confront here: whether a debtor could transfer its insurance 
rights to a § 524(g) trust notwithstanding the policies’ anti-
  Moreover, although the language 
refers to the bankruptcy estate alone, the reference to Section 
1123—which describes transfers from the estate to other 
“entities”—makes it clear that we contemplated transfers to a 
trust as well as inclusion in the estate, since the citation would 
otherwise be superfluous.  See In re Congoleum Corp., No. 
03-51524, 2008 WL 4186899, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 2, 
2008) (describing the “two stage analysis” necessarily 
implicated in Combustion Engineering requiring first transfer 
to the estate and then to the asbestos trust, and noting that 
“any other conclusion” would make the citation to § 
1123(a)(5) “nonsensical”).  
                                              
17 In its unpublished oral opinion, that court rebuffed the 
insurers’ contention that the assignment of “insurance 
proceeds to the personal injury trust . . . violates anti-
assignment provisions in their policies.”  Transcript of Oral 
Opinion at 145, In re Combustion Eng’g, No. 03-10495 (D. 
Del. July 31, 2003).  It reasoned that, since contracts that 
provide for forfeiture in the event of bankruptcy are “void 
under Section 541 of the Code . . . . [i]f the insurers were 
correct in reading the anti-assignment provisions of 
Combustion Engineering’s insurance policies to bar even a 
simple assignment of proceeds to a trust fund for claimants 
created by the reorganization, then these provisions, too, 
should be considered void.”  Id. at 146. 
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assignment provisions.18
                                              
18 Insurers’ other attempts to distinguish Combustion 
Engineering are unavailing.  They suggest the term 
“proceeds” in the opinion referred only to liquidated 
insurance coverage, rather than insurance “rights,” as are at 
issue here.  But the opinion itself refers to “rights to 
proceeds,” and makes it clear that the actual value of many of 
Combustion Engineering’s insurance policies “had yet to be 
determined.”  Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 206 & n.11.  
Insurers also suggest that we would not have reached a 
different conclusion from the Ninth Circuit in Pacific Gas 
without more than a brief discussion in a footnote.  But 
Pacific Gas had been brought to our attention, Letter Pursuant 
to Rule 28(j) from Elit R. Felix, Esq., Counsel for Allianz 
Insurance, In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 
May 27, 2004) (No. 03-3445), and it did not alter our 
conclusion.  We agree with the District Court that these 
contentions are at base an argument that we “did not mean 
what [we] said.” In re Federal-Mogul Global, 402 B.R. at 
637.   
  Footnote 27 sets forth our 
conclusion that any objection to the reorganization plan based 
Insurers also claim that a broad reading of Combustion 
Engineering would conflict with our precedent in Integrated 
Solutions, Inc. v. Service Support Specialties, Inc., 124 F.3d 
487 (3d Cir. 1997).  There, we held the Bankruptcy Code did 
not preempt state law restrictions on the transfer of tort 
claims.  Id. at 491-96.  Insurers argue that this transaction 
would be allowed under a broad reading of § 1123(a).  This 
assertion is incorrect.  The issue in Integrated was preemption 
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on the anti-assignment provisions could be overcome through 
a combination of § 541 and § 1123.  Furthermore, in a recent 
en banc holding, we held that “the discussion of anti-
assignment provisions in Combustion Engineering should 
suffice” to resolve whether insurance policies could be 
transferred to a personal-injury trust.  In re Global Indus. 
Techs., 645 F.3d at 212 n.27 (internal citations removed); id. 
at 218 n.4 (J. Nygaard, dissenting) (“[O]ur holding in 
Combustion Engineering . . . validated the Bankruptcy Code’s 
authorization to preempt anti-assignment policy provisions.”); 
see also Motor Vehicle Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. 
(In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 F.3d 980, 1000 (9th Cir. 
2012) (citing Combustion Engineering for the proposition that 
“Congress has expressly preempted Appellants’ contract 
rights” restricting the transfer of insurance rights to a 524(g) 
trust), amended by --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 1089503 (9th Cir. 
2012); 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1123.01[5] n.24 (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009) (citing 
                                                                                                     
under §§ 363(b)(1) and 704(1), neither of which contained an 
express preemption clause.  124 F.3d  at 493.  We contrasted 
these sections with “other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code” where Congress had employed “explicit language” that 
showed it “intend[ed] to displace state nonbankruptcy law ,” 
particularly the “notwithstanding” clause contained in § 
1123(a).  Id.  Moreover, the sale of the tort claim at issue in 
Integrated was not part of the reorganization plan, and so § 
1123(a) was not applicable.  Id. at 489-90. 
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Combustion Engineering for the proposition that § 1123(a)(5) 
preempts state law).19
 Nevertheless, the proper scope of § 1123(a) was not 
the focus of the many disputes in Combustion Engineering, 
and our brief discussion of the provision did not examine the 
statutory language, structure, and legislative history of § 1123 
for a thorough preemption analysis.  We turn to these factors 
now. 
     
B. 
 Section 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code establishes the 
contents of a plan for reorganization under Chapter 11.  
Subsection (a), at issue here, reads in part:20
                                              
19 Numerous lower courts have also interpreted our holding 
this way, including both lower courts in this case.  See, e.g., 
Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co. v. Global Indus. Technologies, 
Inc., No. 07-1749, 2008 WL 6838582, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. July 
25, 2008), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. In re Global 
Indus. Technologies, 645 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011); In re 
Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 343 B.R. 88, 94-95 (D. Del 2006); 
In re W.R. Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96, 132 n.59 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2011);  In re Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524, 2008 WL 
4186899, at *1-2 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2008); In re 
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 417 B.R. 289, 313 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 2006). 
 
20 The entirety of § 1123(a) provides: 
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(a) Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, a plan shall— 
(1) designate, subject to section 1122 of this 
title, classes of claims, other than claims of a 
kind specified in section 507(a)(2), 
507(a)(3), or 507(a)(8) of this title, and 
classes of interests;  
(2) specify any class of claims or interests 
that is not impaired under the plan;  
(3) specify the treatment of any class of 
claims or interests that is impaired under the 
plan;  
(4) provide the same treatment for each 
claim or interest of a particular class, unless 
the holder of a particular claim or interest 
agrees to a less favorable treatment of such 
particular claim or interest;  
(5) provide adequate means for the plan’s 
implementation, such as—  
(A) retention by the debtor of all or any 
part of the property of the estate;  
(B) transfer of all or any part of the 
property of the estate to one or more 
entities, whether organized before or 
after the confirmation of such plan;  
(C) merger or consolidation of the debtor 
with one or more persons;  
(D) sale of all or any part of the property 
of the estate, either subject to or free of 
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any lien, or the distribution of all or any 
part of the property of the estate among 
those having an interest in such property 
of the estate;  
(E) satisfaction or modification of any 
lien;  
(F) cancellation or modification of any 
indenture or similar instrument;  
(G) curing or waiving of any default;  
(H) extension of a maturity date or a 
change in an interest rate or other term of 
outstanding securities;  
(I) amendment of the debtor’s charter; or  
(J) issuance of securities of the debtor, or 
of any entity referred to in subparagraph 
(B) or (C) of this paragraph, for cash, for 
property, for existing securities, or in 
exchange for claims or interests, or for 
any other appropriate purpose;  
(6) provide for the inclusion in the charter of 
the debtor, if the debtor is a corporation, or 
of any corporation referred to in paragraph 
(5)(B) or (5)(C) of this subsection, of a 
provision prohibiting the issuance of 
nonvoting equity securities, and providing, 
as to the several classes of securities 
possessing voting power, an appropriate 
distribution of such power among such 
classes, including, in the case of any class of 
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(a) Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, a plan shall— 
. . . 
(5) provide adequate means for the plan's 
implementation, such as— 
. . . 
(B) transfer of all or any part of 
the property of the estate to one or 
                                                                                                     
equity securities having a preference over 
another class of equity securities with 
respect to dividends, adequate provisions for 
the election of directors representing such 
preferred class in the event of default in the 
payment of such dividends;  
(7) contain only provisions that are 
consistent with the interests of creditors and 
equity security holders and with public 
policy with respect to the manner of 
selection of any officer, director, or trustee 
under the plan and any successor to such 
officer, director, or trustee; and  
(8) in a case in which the debtor is an 
individual, provide for the payment to 
creditors under the plan of all or such 
portion of earnings from personal services 
performed by the debtor after the 
commencement of the case or other future 
income of the debtor as is necessary for the 
execution of the plan.  
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more entities, whether organized 
before or after the confirmation of 
such plan. 
 
Besides the transfer of estate property, § 1123(a)(5)(A)-(J) 
lists nine other transactions that can constitute “adequate 
means” for plan implementation.  Collier notes, “The types of 
means listed in section 1123(a)(5) are clearly illustrative and 
not exclusive.”  7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1123.01[5]. 
 “When a federal law contains an express preemption 
clause, ‘we focus on the plain wording of the clause, which 
necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ 
preemptive intent.’”  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. 
Whiting, --- U.S. ----,  131 S.Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011) (quoting 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).  
The plain language of § 1123(a) evinces Congress’s clear 
intent to preempt state law.  
The critical words here are “Notwithstanding any 
otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . .”  The Supreme 
Court has held that a “notwithstanding” clause “clearly 
signals the drafter’s intention that the provisions of the 
‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions,” 
noting numerous instances when the courts of appeals “have 
interpreted similar ‘notwithstanding’ language . . . to 
supersede all other laws, stating that ‘[a] clearer statement is 
difficult to imagine.’”  Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 
U.S. 10, 16 (1993) (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting in part N.J. Air Nat’l Guard v. Fed. 
Labor Relations Auth., 677 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1982), and 
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citing In re FCX, Inc., 853 F.2d 1149 (4th Cir. 1988)).  We 
have specifically cited § 1123(a) as an instance where 
Congress used “explicit language” to demonstrate its intent 
“to displace state nonbankruptcy law,”  Integrated Solutions, 
Inc., 124 F.3d at 493, and two other courts of appeals have 
determined that the “notwithstanding” clause in § 1123(a) 
expressly preempts state law, Pac. Gas, 350 F.3d at 946; In re 
FCX, Inc., 853 F.2d at 1154-55. 
 Our conclusion that  § 1123(a) preempts state law does 
not end our inquiry, since we must still “identify the domain 
expressly pre-empted” by the statutory language.  Lohr, 518 
U.S. at 484 (quoting Cippolone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 
504, 517 (1992)).  Even in instances of express preemption, 
the presumption in favor of state law applies, requiring us to 
accept “a plausible alternative reading . . . that disfavors pre-
emption.”  Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 
449 (2005).  Federal-Mogul argues that the plain text of § 
1123 forecloses any alternative reading and requires a 
preemptive scope that reaches the transfer of insurance rights 
at issue here.  But Insurers offer several limiting principles 
they contend construe § 1123 just as sensibly while 
comporting with traditional respect for state law.  
 Insurers first argue from the structure of § 1123(a).  
Section 1123(a) contains eight numbered subsections, (1)-(8), 
specifying the required elements of a reorganization plan.  As 
discussed, under subsection (5) it also contains ten 
transactions, (A)-(J), that can constitute “adequate means for 
the plan’s implementation” as required by § 1123(a)(5).  
These “means” include the “transfer of . . . the property of the 
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estate,” § 1123(a)(5)(B), at issue here, but also, among others, 
the debtor’s retention of estate property, (A); sale or 
distribution of estate property, (D); cancellation or 
modification of any indenture, (F); and curing or waiving of a 
default, (G).   
Insurers propose a reading of § 1123(a) that excises § 
1123(a)(5)(A)-(J) from the scope of § 1123(a), contending the 
“means” listed there are not subject to the “notwithstanding” 
clause.   In other words, Insurers draw a sharp dichotomy 
between what they style as the “illustrative examples of non-
required transactions” enumerated as adequate means and the 
rest of subsection § 1123(a).  Br. for Certain Appellants at 24-
25. 
 We disagree.  It is hardly natural to read the 
“notwithstanding” clause in § 1123(a) as applying only to 
some, but not all, of subsection(a), an approach that 
contravenes any normal method of statutory interpretation.  
“The presumption is that the statute flows in orderly 
progression from general statement to specific instance so 
that ordinarily the qualification of a later clause upon an 
earlier one is to be expected.”  1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. 
Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 20:7 (7th ed. 2007).  This approach is also at 
odds with the interpretation of the Fourth Circuit, which held 
that, “[b]y its plain language,” the “notwithstanding” clause 
encompassed § 1123(a)(5)(D).  In re FCX, Inc., 853 F.2d at 
1154.  It could hardly be read otherwise; no other express 
preemption provision is necessary.  We also agree with the 
District Court that the contrary interpretation would have 
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absurd results: many of the means listed would be impossible 
to accomplish without preempting nonbankruptcy law.21
 London Market Insurers further contend the phrase 
“otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law” in § 1123(a) does 
not encompass private contracts.  They note that elsewhere in 
the Bankruptcy Code Congress used language that explicitly 
preempts private contracts as well as governmental 
enactments.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(l) (“notwithstanding 
any provision in a contract, a lease, or applicable law”); 11 
U.S.C. § 1124(2) (“notwithstanding any contractual provision 
or applicable law”).  
  For 
these reasons, we conclude the preemptive scope of § 1123(a) 
reaches all the provisions in subsection (a). 
 We agree with the District Court in rejecting this 
interpretation.  Many of the transactions listed under § 
                                              
21 We also find relevant § 1123(d), which provides:  
“Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and sections 
506(b), 1129(a)(7), and 1129(b) of this title, if it is proposed 
in a plan to cure a default the amount necessary to cure the 
default shall be determined in accordance with the underlying 
agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law.”  The reference 
to subsection (a) indicates that, absent this provision, § 1123 
would operate to preempt nonbankruptcy law governing the 
curing of defaults.  The only reference to curing a default in § 
1123 appears at § 1123(a)(5)(G), in the list of transactions 
that could constitute “adequate means.”  We find this strong 
evidence that Congress interpreted § 1123(a) to reach the ten 
transactions listed under § 1123(a)(5).   
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1123(a)(5) implicate contractual rights, and so demonstrate 
clear congressional intent that the phrase “nonbankruptcy 
law” encompass private contracts.  The Fourth Circuit 
endorsed this view when it held that § 1123(a) preempts the 
contractual provisions of patronage certificates.  In re FCX, 
Inc., 853 F.2d at 1154- 55.   Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has held that the phrase “all other law” in a preemption 
provision preempts private contracts.  Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. 
Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117 (1991).   Since 
“[a] contract has no legal force apart from the [state] law that 
acknowledges its binding character,” the Court concluded that 
the preemptive language at issue “effects an override of 
contractual obligations . . . by suspending application of the 
law that makes the contract binding.”22
                                              
22 London Market Insurers attempt to distinguish Norfolk on 
the ground that the collective bargaining agreement at issue in 
that case was required by law, a fact that played no role in the 
Court’s reasoning or conclusions about the preemptive scope 
of the statute in that case.  They also point to two other 
Supreme Court cases, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 
U.S. 504 (1992), and American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 
U.S. 219 (1995), where the Court refused to apply preemption 
clauses to contract provisions.  But in both cases, the Court 
specifically distinguished the language at issue in those 
cases—which spoke to state “requirements and prohibitions” 
and “enact[ments] and enforce[ments]” respectively—from 
the “all other law” provision in Norfolk.  Cipollone, 505 U.S. 
at 526 n.24; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229 nn.5-6.  The Wolens 
Court also stressed that, in Norfolk, the railroad 
  Id. at 130.  This 
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reasoning applies to § 1123(a) and the insurance policies at 
issue.  Accordingly, on the strength of statutory language and 
precedent, we conclude the phrase “otherwise applicable 
nonbankruptcy law” encompasses private contracts, including 
the insurance policies at issue here.  
 Insurers also claim that the context and structure of the 
Bankruptcy Code support a narrow reading of preemption.  
See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest 
Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (describing the 
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code as “a holistic 
endeavor” where a single ambiguous provision “is often 
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme”).   They 
point to other Code provisions they argue would be rendered 
superfluous by a broad interpretation of § 1123(a)’s scope, 
contending that Congress could not have intended § 1123 to 
make a hash out of a carefully defined and balanced statutory 
scheme. 
 As an initial matter, § 1123(a) by its express terms 
does not displace other portions of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Other Code provisions that place specific limitations on the 
satisfaction of a lien, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A), on the 
curing of a default, id. § 365(b), on the issuance of securities 
notwithstanding certain securities laws, id. § 1145, or on the 
                                                                                                     
reorganization scheme at issue would have been impossible to 
effect if collective bargaining agreements were not 
preempted—an argument readily analogized to the context of 
bankruptcy reorganization and private contracts.  Wolens, 513 
U.S. at 229 n.6. 
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use or sale of estate property, id. § 363(l), still operate to 
condition § 1123(a). 23
                                              
23 Moreover, we are unconvinced these provisions conflict 
with § 1123(a).  11 U.S.C. § 1145—which appears in the 
subchapter on “postconfirmation matters”—includes far more 
than those securities issued under a reorganization plan and 
encompasses numerous situations where § 1123 would not 
apply.  11 U.S.C. § 1129 places specific limitations on when a 
bankruptcy court may approve a plan, and so constitutes an 
unambiguous check on a debtor’s power under § 1123.  For 
instance, the statement in § 1123(b)(1) that “a plan may 
impair . . . any class of claims” is obviously not an 
untrammeled right, but subject to the careful procedure set 
out in § 1129 establishing when a plan may impair a claim 
without a creditor’s consent.  11 U.S.C. § 365—which relates 
only to executory contracts and leases, not the entire range of 
potential defaults—is consonant with § 1123(d), described 
above, which limits the otherwise applicable scope of 
preemption under § 1123(a)(5)(G) concerning defaults.  
Finally, the authorization in 11 U.S.C. § 363(l) for the “use, 
sale, or lease of [estate] property” in a plan “notwithstanding 
any provision in a contract, a lease, or applicable law that is 
conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the 
debtor” is distinct from the transfer provision at 11 U.S.C. § 
1123(a)(5)(B).   Although neither “sale” nor “use” are defined 
terms in the Bankruptcy Code, the transfer of insurance rights 
from the debtor to the § 524(g) trust at issue here would 
constitute neither under the common and legal definitions of 
those terms.  Sections 363(l) and 1123(a)(5)(B) also address 
  Had Congress wanted to limit the 
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preemptive scope of § 1123 based on specific sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code, as Insurers suggest, it knew how to do 
so—the Bankruptcy Code features many instances when the 
exercise of a statutory right is expressly “subject to” the 
provisions of another part of the Code.24
                                                                                                     
different stages of the bankruptcy.  As its location in the Code 
makes clear, § 363 focuses on the consequences of entering 
the bankruptcy process. It does not describe the requirements 
for proposing and approving a Chapter 11 reorganization 
plan, which are found in §§ 1121-1129.  See In re Federal-
Mogul Global Inc., 385 B.R. at 572-73. 
  But rather than 
addressing the relationship between § 1123(a) and the rest of 
the Code clause-by-clause, Congress unambiguously limited 
the scope of the “notwithstanding” clause in § 1123(a) to 
“nonbankruptcy law,” leaving other Code provisions intact. 
24 Several such instances appear within § 1123 itself.  See, 
e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (“[A]  plan shall designate, 
subject to section 1122 of this title, classes of claims, other 
than claims of a kind specified in section 507(a)(2), 507(a)(3), 
or 507(a)(8) of this title, and classes of interests”); id. § 
1123(b)(2) (“[A] plan may[,] subject to section 365 of this 
title, provide for the assumption, rejection, or assignment of 
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor not 
previously rejected under such section”); id. § 1123(c) (“In a 
case concerning an individual, a plan proposed by an entity 
other than the debtor may not provide for the use, sale, or 
lease of property exempted under section 522 of this title, 
unless the debtor consents to such use, sale, or lease.”).   
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  Insurers particularly urge that a broad reading of the 
preemptive scope of § 1123(a) is inconsistent with 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1142, which governs the implementation of the 
reorganization plan.  Section 1142(a) provides, 
“Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy 
law, rule, or regulation relating to financial condition, the 
debtor and any entity organized or to be organized for the 
purpose of carrying out the plan shall carry out the plan and 
shall comply with any orders of the court.”25
This contention finds support in Pacific Gas, 350 F.3d 
932, where the court confronted a bankruptcy reorganization 
plan that would have allowed the debtor, a public utility, to 
  Insurers argue it 
would be illogical for the scope of preemption in § 1123, 
which provides what the plan should contain, to exceed that 
provided for in § 1142, which provides for the plan’s 
implementation, and so the two provisions must be read in 
pari materia. 
                                              
25 The District Court ruled that, even if § 1142(a) did apply, 
under the rule of the last antecedent the phrase “relating to 
financial condition” referred only to regulations and not a 
“law” or “rule.”  We agree with Insurers that in this instance 
this canon should not apply.  See Shendock v. Dir., Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1464 (3d Cir. 
1990) (“[W]here the sense of the entire act requires that a 
qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding or even 
succeeding sections, the word or phrase will not be restricted 
to its immediate antecedent.” (quoting 2A N. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.33, at 
245 (4th ed. 1984))). 
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contravene state law by disaggregating.  Id. at 935-37.  The 
court limited the express preemptive scope of § 1123(a)(5) to 
that of § 1142(a)—that is, to state laws “relating to financial 
condition”—and remanded.  Id.  The court reached this 
conclusion based primarily on legislative history, which we 
will discuss, but also reasoned that importing the language of 
§ 1142(a) into § 1123(a) made structural sense, because the 
two sections work in tandem: § 1123(a) establishes what a 
confirmable reorganization plan must contain, while § 
1142(a) provides for the implementation of the plan.  Id. at 
946-48.   
Although we regard Pacific Gas as factually 
distinguishable from this case,26
                                              
26 After briefing and oral argument in this case, the Ninth 
Circuit published an opinion holding that federal law 
preempts anti-assignment provisions that purport to bar the 
transfer of insurance rights to a § 524(g) trust.  In re Thorpe 
Insulation, 671 F.3d at 999-1001.  Distinguishing Pacific Gas 
and limiting its holding solely to the scope of § 1123, the 
court determined that 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) expressly preempts 
anti-assignment provisions and that 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) 
impliedly preempts them as an obstacle to congressional 
purposes.  Id.  Accordingly, even under Ninth Circuit case 
law, the anti-assignment provisions at issue here would be 
preempted. 
 we are also unconvinced that 
§§ 1123 and 1142 are so similar that they must be read 
together.  See Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 606 
(1970) (declining to read two sections dealing with the same 
subject in pari materia when “the coverage of these sections 
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is not identical”).  Collier describes the plan provisions under 
§ 1123 as “self-executing,” 7 Collier ¶ 1123.01[5], which 
would seem to obviate the need for subsequent 
“implementation” under § 1142.  Federal-Mogul suggests 
that, since § 1142 appears in a subchapter addressing 
“postconfirmation matters,” it implicates a different stage in 
the bankruptcy proceeding from § 1123 and provides a post-
confirmation safe harbor for certain actions taken in 
conformity with the plan.  This interpretation is at least 
plausible, especially in light of the absence of any contrary 
case law examining preemption under § 1142(a).27
                                              
27 The case law on preemption under § 1142(a) is sparse.  The 
handful of relevant cases include In re Sugarhouse Realty, 
Inc., No. 92-23024 SR, 1995 WL 114151 at *31-*32 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. March 15, 1995) (holding that under § 1142 the 
bankruptcy court may require specific performance when it 
might not be available under Pennsylvania law on the ground 
that applying state law “would eviscerate the language of 11 
U.S.C. § 1142 and seemingly contravene the supremacy 
clause”); In re Am. Freight Sys., Inc., 179 B.R. 952, 961 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (rejecting a claim by a freight carrier 
that under § 1142 it may pursue certain post-confirmation 
claims prohibited by federal law); In re Pearson Indus., 152 
B.R. 546, 557 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that, while a 
debtor post-confirmation was generally expected to comply 
with “all applicable laws” like “any other business entity,” § 
1142 preempted parts of the Illinois Corporation Act).   
  Section 
1142 is also distinguishable from § 1123 because it 
encompasses “orders of the court,” suggesting that the limited 
47 
 
preemptive language might serve primarily as a check on the 
court’s authority to trump non-bankruptcy law in 
supplemental orders enacting the plan.  Case law supports this 
interpretation, since nearly all of the cases construing § 1142 
have involved the proper scope of the bankruptcy court’s 
postconfirmation jurisdiction and authority.28
We need not resolve the scope of § 1142(a), however, 
because well-established principles of statutory interpretation 
militate against assimilating the two sections where Congress 
employed different words.  “[W]here the legislature has 
inserted a provision in only one of two statutes that deal with 
closely related subject matter, it is reasonable to infer that the 
failure to include that provision in the other statute was 
deliberate rather than inadvertent.”  2B Sutherland Statutes 
and Statutory Construction § 51.2.  Thus, “limiting words” 
that appear in one provision are not ordinarily read into 
another that omits them, because we presume that “Congress 
   
                                              
28 See, e.g., Goodman v. Phillip R. Curtis Enters., 809 F.2d 
228 (4th Cir. 1987)  (limiting the authority of the bankruptcy 
court following confirmation of the plan to matters 
concerning implementation or execution); Walnut Assocs. v. 
Saidel, 164 B.R. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that subject 
matter jurisdiction is conferred on the bankruptcy court only 
to resolve postconfirmation matters); In re Johns-Manville 
Corp., 97 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1989) (determining that 
bankruptcy court retains postconfirmation jurisdiction over 
fundamental questions of the interpretation and 
administration of plan in the context of asbestos suits filed 
against debtor). 
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acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 
U.S. 53, 62-63 (2006) (quoting in part Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).29  Moreover, even if §§ 1123 
and 1142 were properly read in pari materia, “where two 
statutes deal with the same subject matter, the more recent 
enactment prevails as the latest expression of legislative will.”  
2B Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.2.  
Pacific Gas reversed this presumption by making the reading 
of the 1984 amendment of § 1123 conditional on the earlier 
passage of § 1142 in 1978.  We believe the logical course is 
to assume that Congress was aware of the preemptive 
language of § 1142 when it subsequently amended § 1123 to 
contain a preemptive provision with a different scope.  
Therefore, we decline to limit the preemptive scope of § 
1123(a) to those state laws relating to financial condition.30
                                              
29 A number of cases have applied this canon in the 
bankruptcy context.  See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. 
Ass’n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 450 (1999) 
(“It is unlikely that the drafters of legislation so long and 
minutely contemplated as the 1978 Bankruptcy Code would 
have used two distinctly different forms of words for the 
same purpose”); Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 
940-42 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating, in the context of two similar 
bankruptcy provisions, “[w]e will not contravene 
congressional intent by implying statutory language that 
Congress omitted”).   
 
30 We find further support for this conclusion in 11 U.S.C. § 
1123(d).  As discussed above, subsection (d) establishes that, 
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In sum, we find no textual support to limit the scope of 
the “notwithstanding” clause only to part of § 1123(a), to 
state enactments, or to the preemptive reach of § 1142(a).  
The plain language of § 1123(a) evinces clear congressional 
intent for a preemptive scope that includes the transactions 
listed under § 1123(a)(5) as “adequate means” for the plan’s 
implementation, including the transfer of property authorized 
by (a)(5)(B).  The plain language also reaches private 
contracts enforced by state common law, and overcomes the 
presumption against preemption.  As we will discuss, we do 
not believe that the scope is limitless, but it is broad enough 
to encompass the anti-assignment provisions of insurance 
policies that purport to bar transfer to a § 524(g) trust. 
                                                                                                     
“[n]otwithstanding subsection (a) of this section,” the amount 
necessary to cure a default under the plan is determined by 
applicable nonbankruptcy law.  If subsection (a) only 
preempted nonbankruptcy law related to financial condition, 
such a proviso would likely be unnecessary, since a law 
defining the amount necessary to cure a default does not 
relate to financial condition, at least as that term is currently 
defined as analogous in meaning to insolvency, see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(c)(1)(B) (invalidating restrictions of the transfer of 
property to the estate when “conditioned on the insolvency or 
financial condition of the debtor”); In re Transcon Lines, 58 
F.3d 1432, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Am. Freight Sys., 
Inc., 179 B.R. at 960.   
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C. 
Insurers also urge a narrow reading of § 1123(a) on the 
basis of prior practice and legislative history.  They suggest 
preemption deviates from pre-Code bankruptcy practice and 
should be disfavored, and legislative history establishes that 
Congress intended the 1984 revisions to the Code to be 
minor.  But the evidence from these sources is too equivocal 
to overcome the plain meaning of the text, which provides 
compelling evidence of Congress’s intent to preempt contrary 
non-bankruptcy law. 
The legislative history of the “notwithstanding” clause 
in § 1123(a) is thin and inconclusive.  Section 1123, enacted 
as part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, codified a similar 
provision at § 77B(b)(9) of the earlier Bankruptcy Act.  Pac. 
Gas, 350 F.3d at 938.  In its original form, § 1123(a) 
specified, as it does now, the elements a Chapter 11 
reorganization plan shall contain, mandating that it provide 
“adequate means” including “the transfer of all or any of the 
property of the estate.”  An Act to Establish a Uniform Law 
on the Subject of Bankruptcies, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 
1123(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2631-32 (1978).  It contained no 
preemption provision.  But § 1142(a), also enacted as part of 
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, provided for the “execution” of a 
reorganization plan “notwithstanding  any otherwise 
applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . relating to financial 
condition.”  Id. § 1142, at 2639.  During debate, one senator 
read this preemptive language to encompass § 1123 as well, 
noting that under § 1123 “[i]f the [reorganization] plan is 
confirmed, then any action proposed in the plan may be taken 
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notwithstanding any otherwise applicable bankruptcy law in 
accordance with section 1142(a) of title 11.”  124 Cong. Rec. 
34,005 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).31
The addition of the clause “notwithstanding any 
otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law” to § 1123(a) was 
first proposed in 1980, reintroduced in 1983, and enacted as 
part of the Bankruptcy and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.  
  
                                              
31 The import of this statement is the cause of some debate.  
In Pacific Gas, the Ninth Circuit cited this as evidence that 
Congress intended §§ 1123 and 1142 to be read together.  350 
F.3d at 941-42, 948.  The District Court in this case rejected 
this view, citing “the inherent infirmity of relying on the floor 
remarks of a single senate subcommittee chairman as 
controlling authority,” and instead stressed the importance of 
the difference in language between the two provisions.  In re 
Federal-Mogul Global, 402 B.R. at 640-41 (citing In re 
Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993)).  This was 
particularly true, the District Court found, because Congress 
presumably had knowledge of the language of § 1142 when it 
altered § 1123 six years later, and chose not to adopt it.  Id.  
We agree with the District Court that a statement by a single 
senator suggesting the preemptive scope of § 1123 in 1978 is 
not dispositive of its scope after modification in 1984.  If 
anything , Senator DeConcini’s statement seems to support 
the presumption that Congress acted purposefully in selecting 
different language for § 1123.  Cf. In re FCX, Inc., 853 F.2d 
at 1154 n.7 (citing Sen. DeConcini’s statement to support the 
claim that § 1123(a) preempted the private contract 
restrictions at issue). 
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This modification occasioned little discussion.  When 
originally proposed as part of a package of “technical 
amendments” intended to redress errors in “printing, spelling, 
punctuation, grammar, syntax, and numeration,” the changes 
to § 1123 were described as “mak[ing] it clear that the rules 
governing what is to be contained in the reorganization plan 
are those specified in this section.”  H.R. Rep. No. 96-1195, 
at 1, 22 (1980). 32
Insurers argue that the relative congressional silence 
on the amendment of § 1123 is telling.  Courts will not 
presume a departure from pre-Code bankruptcy practice in 
the absence of clear congressional intent.  Hamilton v. 
Lanning, --- U.S. ----, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2473-74 (2010); 
Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1998); Pac. Gas, 
350 F.3d at 943-44.  Insurers characterize pre-Code practice 
as requiring reorganization plans to conform to state law, 
  In 1983, a Senate report described the 
amendment as making “technical stylistic changes.” S. Rep. 
No. 98-65, at 84 (1983).  The amendment, including the 
“notwithstanding” clause, passed the following year as part of 
a subsection labeled “Miscellaneous Amendments to Title 
11.”  Pub. L. No. 98-353, Subtitle H, § 502, 98 Stat. 333, 367 
& 385 (1984).  
                                              
32 Insurers point to this statement as evidence for their 
contention that preemption applies only to part of § 1123(a).   
But this brief sentence is too equivocal to prove much.  It 
might also be reasonably interpreted to support the opposing 
conclusion that the rules specified in the section, including 
the transactions listed as “adequate means,” are the only laws 
governing the contents of a reorganization plan. 
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arguing that an amendment characterized as “technical” and 
“stylistic” does not demonstrate congressional intent to 
substantially revise bankruptcy practice.  This argument was 
endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in limiting the preemptive 
scope of § 1123 to laws relating to financial condition, Pac. 
Gas, 350 F.3d at 947, and it also finds support, Insurers 
claim, in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cohen, which found 
that a “stylistic change” enacted in the same 1984 
amendments at issue here did not alter the meaning of a 
different provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 523 U.S. at 221. 
We see no reason to question Insurers’ account of pre-
Code bankruptcy practice, which seems borne out by case law 
and commentary.33
Pre-Code bankruptcy practice was not the law when 
the “notwithstanding” clause was added to § 1123 in 1984; 
  But we disagree with the inference that 
this practice, coupled with the thin legislative history of § 
1123, establishes their proposed narrow preemptive scope for 
§ 1123.  
                                              
33 See, e.g., Brocket v. Winkle Terra Cotta Co., 81 F.2d 949 
(8th Cir. 1936) (refusing to allow the issuance of stock under 
a reorganization plan without adequate financial support 
required by state law); 6A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶10.19, at 
89 & n. 8 (14th ed. 1977) (“Whatever the means chosen [for 
reorganization], it must be remembered that conformity with 
other applicable state or federal laws may be necessary. . . .”); 
Br. for Certain Appellants at 36 n.8 (collecting similar cases).  
We are unconvinced by Federal-Mogul’s efforts to 
demonstrate that pre-Code practice was otherwise. 
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the existing law was the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.  The 1978 
Code substantially altered earlier practice, see generally 
David Skeel, Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law 
in America 131-83 (2001) (describing the Code’s 
“transformative effect on bankruptcy as we know it”), 
including the addition of the preemptive language in § 1142 
that modified prior practice and allowed the implementation 
of a plan notwithstanding some nonbankruptcy laws.34
                                              
34 The addition of the “notwithstanding” clause in § 1142 was 
the only meaningful modification of that section from the 
corresponding Bankruptcy Act provision.  8 Collier ¶ 
1142.LH.  This constituted a substantial break from pre-Code 
practice: cases like Brocket would come out differently post-
Code, since the state law at issue in that case related to the 
debtors’ financial condition under § 1142(a). 
  The 
fifteenth edition of Collier, which came out after the 1978 
Code, broke with prior editions’ admonition that a plan’s 
terms may be required to conform to state law, and stated 
instead that under § 1123, “a plan may propose such actions 
notwithstanding nonbankruptcy law or agreements.”  In re 
Kizzac Mgmt. Corp., 44 B.R. 496, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (quoting 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1123.01 [5] at 
1123–10 (15th ed. 1979)).  Case law from the period between 
1978 and 1984 generally, although not unanimously, held that 
§ 1123 preempted state law.  See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 
29 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that, since § 1123(a)(5)(G) 
provides the authority to cure a default in a Chapter 11 
proceeding, “[a] state law to the contrary must fall before the 
Bankruptcy Code”); Valente v. Sav. Bank of Rockville, 34 
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B.R. 362, 365-67 & n.3 (D. Conn. 1983) (concluding that § 
1123(a)(5)(G) allows for the curing of defaults 
notwithstanding state court judgments under the Supremacy 
Clause); In re Kizzac Mgmt. Corp., 44 B.R. at 504 (holding 
that § 1123(a)(5)(E) grants the bankruptcy court the power to 
compel an assignment rather than a satisfaction of a 
mortgage).35
But whatever the proper characterization of prior 
practice, it deserves little weight here.  We decline to rely on 
it, or on a thin and vague legislative history that says nearly 
nothing about the intended preemptive scope of § 1123(a), to 
overcome the plain and unambiguous meaning of the words 
Congress chose.  “As always, the most authoritative 
  But see In re Celeste Court Apartments, Inc., 47 
B.R. 470, 473-74 (D. Del. 1985) (finding no evidence in the 
unamended text of § 1123 or its legislative history that 
Congress intended it to upset a state court judgment on a 
defaulted mortgage).  Taken together, this evidence suggests 
that the 1984 amendment did not mark a sharp break with 
earlier practice under the Code, but rather clarified and 
expanded the scope of preemption under § 1123.  Notably, 
this conclusion was endorsed by the Fourth Circuit.  See In re 
FCX, Inc., 853 F.2d at 1154 n.7 (“We do not understand the 
amendment [to § 1123(a)] to have effected a substantive 
change in prior law.”). 
                                              
35 Insurers argue that Valente and Kizzac stand only for the 
proposition that the Bankruptcy Court may modify the rights 
of creditors.  Certain Appellants Reply Br. at 20 n.8.  Yet 
both courts analyzed the question presented under the Court’s 
power under § 1123 to preempt state law. 
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indicators of what Congress intended are the words that it 
chose in drafting the statute.”  United States v. Lavin, 942 
F.2d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 1991).  Thus, “while pre-Code practice 
informs our understanding of the language of the 
[Bankruptcy] Code, it cannot overcome that language.” 
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 
U.S. 1, 10 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  “[W]here the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
text is itself clear . . . its operation is unimpeded by contrary . 
. . prior practice.”  Id. (alteration and omissions in original) 
(quoting BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 
(1994)).  Here, Congress chose words that it employed 
throughout the Bankruptcy Code to mandate preemption, 
words the Supreme Court has interpreted as the clearest 
possible statement of preemptive intent.  It would be an odd 
method of interpretation to rummage deep into the legislative 
history, and, finding practically nothing, conclude that this 
silence implies that Congress could not have meant what it 
said when it wrote the statute.  The more sensible course 
reads the statutory text itself as indicative of congressional 
intent, which, based on the unambiguous language here, was 
to preempt nonbankruptcy state and federal law. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Cohen supports this 
view.  There, the petitioner argued the 1984 addition of the 
phrase “to the extent obtained by” to 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(2)(A), which barred discharge from liability for fraud, 
limited recovery from his estate to the actual amount of fraud 
and did not include the treble damages awarded by the 
bankruptcy court in an adversary proceeding.  Cohen, 523 
U.S. at 215.  In rejecting this argument, the Court turned first 
57 
 
to the plain language of the provision, noting that the 
petitioner’s proposed interpretation was at odds with both the 
“most straightforward reading” of the statute as well as the 
phrase’s meaning in parallel provisions.  Id. at 218-21.  Only 
after exhausting the statute’s wording did the Court turn to 
the provision’s history, noting that, in addition to its 
description in the legislative history as only a “stylistic 
change,” the language of the 1984 amendment “in no way 
signals an intention to narrow the established scope of the 
fraud exception.”  Id. at 221-22.  “If . . . Congress wished to 
limit the exception [to the amount of actual fraud],”  the 
Court continued, “one would expect Congress to have made 
unmistakably clear its intent.”  Id.    
As this overview makes clear, the legislative history of 
the 1984 amendment to the Bankruptcy Code was a minor 
piece of corroborating evidence in an opinion that looked 
primarily to plain text of the provision to discern 
congressional intent.  Fidelity to this approach in this case 
demonstrates that Congress made its intent clear.  As we have 
discussed, the “most straightforward reading” of § 1123(a) 
cuts against Insurers’ proposed narrow interpretation.  
Moreover, unlike the ambiguous amendment in Cohen, the 
addition of the “notwithstanding” clause to § 1123 is an 
“unmistakably clear” signal of congressional intent to 
preempt that overcomes any inference based on passing 
references to “technical” or “stylistic” changes.  In short, we 
believe Cohen mandates rather than undermines an 
interpretation derived from a statute’s plain text. 
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Having examined the history of § 1123, we find 
nothing that indicates we should read its preemptive scope 
narrowly.  While pre-Code practice may suggest that 
historically courts did not allow a reorganization plan to 
preempt contrary state law, the 1978 Code altered that prior 
practice.  The thin legislative history of the 1984 amendment 
of § 1123 characterizing the change as “stylistic” and 
“technical” does not overcome the plain and explicit language 
of the preemption provision.  That language unambiguously 
provides for preemption, at least in this context, and we give 
its meaning effect. 
D. 
Although our discussion resolves the legal question 
before us, it bears noting that preemption here furthers the 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.  The debtor here seeks to 
use its existing assets to address current and future claims 
arising out of past occurrences and resolve its asbestos 
liability, a goal consonant with the “fresh start” purpose of 
bankruptcy.  Because a 524(g) trust is created only through a 
Chapter 11 proceeding, a contractual limitation on the 
assignment of the debtors’ property to a trust functions 
analogously to contract provisions that alter a debtor’s rights 
in the event of insolvency.  Such provisions are preempted 
under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B), which provides that “an 
interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the 
estate . . . notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, 
transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . that 
is conditioned on the [debtor’s] insolvency.”  The purpose of 
this provision is to prevent creditors and others from 
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employing a debtor’s bankruptcy filing to diminish post-filing 
contractual rights.  Its inclusion in the Code establishes that 
preemption in this instance—where the transfer of insurance 
rights corresponds with the transfer of the debtor’s 
preexisting liabilities into an asbestos trust authorized by the 
Code—furthers the purposes of bankruptcy.  Cf. In re Thorpe 
Insulation, 671 F.3d at 1000 (holding that § 541(c) itself 
preempts anti-assignment provisions that bar transfer to a 
524(g) trust).36
 Preemption in this instance also furthers the purposes 
of 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).  Congress created 524(g) as the best 
course to harmonize the interests of asbestos claimants and 
reorganized debtors alike.  See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 46-
48 (1994).  This approach would “help asbestos victims 
receive maximum value,” 140 Cong. Rec. 28,358 (1994) 
(statement of Sen. Heflin), but also ensure a company’s 
continued profitability, converting it into the “goose that lays 
the golden egg by remaining a viable operation and 
maximizing the trust’s assets to pay claims,” id. at 8,021 
(statement of Sen. Brown).  The trust mechanism furthered 
“the fundamental rationale of chapter 11, that a reorganized 
debtor emerges from bankruptcy free and clear other than the 
liability set by the plan.”  Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-
835, at 47 (noting that the uncertainties surrounding asbestos-
related bankruptcies had “undermined the ‘fresh start’ 
 
                                              
36 Federal-Mogul did not argue either before the District 
Court or on appeal that the trust is part of the estate, as the 
Ninth Circuit concluded in Thorpe. 
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objectives of bankruptcy”).  As these statements demonstrate, 
Congress believed the transfer of a corporation’s assets to a 
trust to ensure the equitable compensation of present and 
future claimants, in return for a release from future liability, 
served the “fundamental” purposes of bankruptcy.  The anti-
assignment provisions at issue would impede these objectives 
by depriving both debtors and claimants access to assets 
specifically intended to compensate for potential losses.  In 
these circumstances, construing § 1123(a) to preempt these 
contracts is consonant with congressional intent and public 
policy.  Cf. In re Thorpe Insulation, 671 F.3d at 1000-01 
(holding that anti-assignment provisions barring transfer to a 
trust are impliedly preempted because they are an “obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress” in enacting § 524(g)). 
 Insurers argue, however, that the anti-assignment 
provisions serve an important purpose in protecting them 
from covering a risk different from the one they bargained 
for.  Although insurance neutrality language in the 
reorganization plan preserves all other defenses to coverage, 
Insurers contend that the transfer here nonetheless increases 
their exposure because the trust allows claims that would be 
barred in the tort system.   
We doubt whether transfer in this instance materially 
alters Insurers’ risk.  The bankruptcy here shifted debtor’s 
asbestos-related liabilities—based on events which had 
already occurred and for which the insurers were already 
potentially responsible—to the post-confirmation trust.  We 
have questioned whether such a transfer in the asbestos 
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context changes the risk an insurer agreed to cover.37
                                              
37 Global Industrial Technologies found that insurers’ risk 
altered when a reorganization plan’s creation of a Silica Trust 
expanded the number of silica claims from 169 to over 4,600, 
a twenty-seven-fold increase, and when there was substantial 
evidence of collusion.  645 F.3d at 213-14.  No record 
evidence supports a similar finding here.  Instead, Insurers 
argue transfer to the asbestos trust increases their risk solely 
because it may “put[] administration of the trust and claims 
resolution process in the hands of plaintiffs’ lawyers” or may 
“pay[] claims that would not be entitled to payment in the tort 
system.”  Br. for Certain Appellants at 53-54; see also LMI 
Br. at 14-16.  These bare assertions do not rise to the 
exceptional and well-documented increase in risk we found in 
Global Industrial Technologies. 
  See 
Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d at 212 (observing that in 
the Combustion Engineering reorganization plan, “the pre-
petition quantum of asbestos liability was known from four 
decades of asbestos litigation, and moving the pre-petition 
asbestos claims out of the tort system and into a trust system 
did not increase in any meaningful way the insurers’ pre-
petition exposure to asbestos liability.”); see also 3 Couch on 
Insurance § 35.8 (“The purpose of a no assignment clause is 
to protect the insurer from increased liability, and after events 
giving rise to the insurer's liability have occurred, the insurer's 
risk cannot be increased by a change in the insured's 
identity.”).  Here, both the District and Bankruptcy Court 
strongly challenged Insurers’ argument that their risk was 
substantially altered.  In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 402 
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B.R. at 645 (“Appellants have no economic incentive to 
prevent this assignment, particularly whereas here, the events 
creating exposure to asbestos liability have already 
occurred.”); In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 385 B.R. at 
567-69 (collecting cases to establish that “[i]n this case, to the 
extent that the events giving rise to liability have already 
occurred, there will be no additional risk to the insurance 
companies by virtue of the assignments.  Coverage issues . . . 
are all preserved.”).  Insurers have presented no evidence that 
the transfer here alters their risk except, perhaps, through the 
procedural shift that provides recovery through Trust 
Distribution Protocols rather than through the tort system.  
Significantly, those TDPs are mandated by Congress for 
asbestos trusts and must be approved by the bankruptcy court.  
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).  We cannot seriously 
entertain a claim that the insurers had a contractual right to a 
particular public policy.  If, as has been proposed, Congress 
removed all asbestos claims to a nationwide asbestos trust 
that could recover from Federal-Mogul and other responsible 
parties, with procedures identical to those currently provided 
in the § 524(g) trusts, the insurers would have no anti-
assignment claim.  As this hypothetical demonstrates, 
Insurers’ true objection seems to be against the public policy 
Congress chose to enact.38
                                              
38 Insurers also urge that the anti-assignment defense is no 
different from the other defenses specifically preserved to 
them under the plan’s insurance neutrality, and so should also 
be preserved.  We disagree.  Insurers could have offered the 
fact-specific coverage defenses preserved to them in any 
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 Insurers also allege the trust mechanism might distort 
ordinary incentives between insurer and insured, encouraging 
the debtor to collude with claimants and impose costs on the 
insurer.  But as Federal-Mogul points out, this shift in 
incentives is not unique to the asbestos context and occurs in 
bankruptcy where there is a discharge of the liability of the 
debtor but not that of the insurer.  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) 
(“[D]ischarge of the debt of the debtor does not affect the 
liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other 
entity for, such debt.”).  Nor do the Insurers provide any 
evidence of such collusion in this case.  Such bare speculation 
does not establish an increase in risk. 
Although not present here, there may be circumstances 
where the creation of a trust does alter an insurer’s 
exposure—for instance, when its mere existence attracts 
dramatically more claimants—although this is less likely 
given the lengthy history of asbestos liability.  See In re 
Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d at 212 (detailing how the 
creation of a silica trust alone “staggeringly increased—by 
more than 27 times—the pre-petition liability exposure,” 
while distinguishing the asbestos context because the 
                                                                                                     
asbestos proceeding prior to bankruptcy.  By contrast, the 
anti-assignment defense here would exist only after and by 
virtue of the bankruptcy reorganization, and could be invoked 
by an insurer against any claim by the Trust, no matter how 
meritorious.  Moreover, to the extent a determination rested 
on the legitimacy of the TDPs as a method of adjudication, it 
could invite courts to second-guess the judgment of Congress 
and the bankruptcy court. 
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quantum of liability has been established from “four decades 
of asbestos litigation.”).   As our precedent has also 
recognized, there may also be instances where the evidence 
suggests possible collusion between the debtor and the 
claimants.  See id. at 214.  But granting a private party 
powerful leverage that may amount to a de facto veto over the 
reorganization proceeding does not seem a promising solution 
to these potential problems.  Cf. In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 
671 F.3d at 1001 (“[E]nforcing the anti-assignment 
provisions would subject virtually all § 524(g) 
reorganizations to an insurer veto”). 
Congress sought to address these issues when it 
enacted § 524(g) by codifying the “exceptional precautions at 
every stage of the proceeding” employed in the original 
Manville case.  H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 47.  Section 524(g) 
accordingly contains many requirements that must be 
satisfied before such a trust can be approved.   See 
Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234 & n.45.  In conjunction 
with the requirements for plan approval and the rest of the 
Bankruptcy Code, these provisions are intended to protect the 
interests of all affected parties.  Id.  We recently ruled that 
insurers have standing to participate in bankruptcy 
proceedings when the creation of a trust “staggeringly 
increase[s]” insurers’ risk and exposure.  In re Global Indus. 
Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d at 204, 212; see also In re Thorpe 
Insulation, 671 F.3d at 999 (holding that insurers have 
bankruptcy standing “to participate in the proceedings 
culminating in approval of [a] § 524(g) plan”).  We have 
redressed procedural deficiencies in asbestos-related 
bankruptcies that did not adequately satisfy the requirements 
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of the Code, including § 524(g).  In re Congoleum Corp., 426 
F.3d at 687-93; In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 233-48.  
As these examples underscore, we believe careful 
consideration of the protections of the Bankruptcy Code, 
together with traditional requirements of procedural due 
process, adequately guard the interests of all affected parties. 
III. 
Insurers raise hypotheticals proposing scenarios where 
Chapter 11 debtors might employ the Bankruptcy Code to 
avoid the strictures of federal or state law, and argue 
Congress could not have intended this absurd result.  Because 
the Bankruptcy Code clearly provides preemption in this 
instance, we need not decide whether it would also be proper 
in the situations imagined by Insurers.  Nonetheless, we 
would find problematic attempts under § 1123(a) to disregard 
large swaths of state and federal regulatory schemes.  Cf. Pac. 
Gas, 350 F.3d at 937 (rejecting an “across-the-board, take-no-
prisoners preemption strategy” in which the debtor, a public 
utility, sought to disaggregate notwithstanding contrary state 
law under § 1123(a), thereby avoiding regulation by the 
California Public Utility Commission).  Eighteen states have 
previously filed an amicus brief with us on this issue, 
cautioning that an “overly broad reading” of § 1123(a) 
“would destroy [their] ability to preserve their regulatory 
authority in the face of a bankruptcy filing.”  Br. and App. of 
Amicus Curiae States at 1-3, In re Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 
645 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 08-3650), 2008 WL 
8134099 at *1-*3. 
66 
 
But the scope of preemption under § 1123(a) is not 
unlimited, and our holding does not suggest otherwise.  Any 
reorganization plan must still comply with all aspects of the 
Bankruptcy Code and be approved by the bankruptcy court.  
In particular, it must satisfy 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3), which 
provides that a court shall confirm a reorganization plan only 
if it “has been proposed in good faith and not by any means 
forbidden by law.”  We have stated that this good faith 
standard ensures that a plan will “fairly achieve a result 
consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Code.” In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 242 (3d Cir. 
2000) (quoting In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 
143, 150 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
  Moreover, although the text of § 1123(a) does not 
explicitly state a limitation on its preemptive scope, well-
established principles suggest that its scope is not unbounded.  
One important restriction is the long-standing presumption 
against preemption of state police power laws and regulations 
rooted in “federalism concerns and the historic primacy of 
state regulation of matters of health and safety.”  Lohr, 518 
U.S. at 485.  The Supreme Court relied on similar principles 
to hold that the trustee of a debtor in Chapter 7 liquidation 
proceedings could not abandon property in contravention of 
state environmental law, despite enjoying the authority under 
11 U.S.C. § 554(a) to abandon “any property of the estate that 
is burdensome to the estate.”  Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986).  Notwithstanding 
the language of the statute, the Court reasoned that Congress 
did not intend the abandonment power under § 554 to 
preempt all state laws, citing as evidence pre-Code practice, 
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the Bankruptcy Code’s general solicitude for state safety and 
health regulations, and congressional interest in enforcing 
similar laws.  Id. at 500-07.  Although prior practice is more 
mixed in this case,39
The anti-assignment provisions at issue here do not 
implicate public health, safety, and welfare.  But limitation of 
§ 1123(a)’s preemptive scope on these grounds is sensible, 
and seemingly consonant with congressional intent, the 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, and precedent.  It has often 
been noted that the Code exists not to provide a “haven for 
wrongdoers,” but to “relieve the honest debtor from the 
weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start 
afresh.”  In re Davis, 194 F.3d 570, 573-74 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting in part Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 
 the other justifications the Court invoked 
to construct a common-law limitation also apply to § 1123(a).  
In Montgomery County, Md. v. Barwood, Inc., 422 B.R. 40 
(D. Md. 2009), the District of Maryland applied the Court’s 
holding in Midlantic, as well as other relevant precedent, to 
the preemptive scope of § 1123(a).   It concluded that “§ 
1123(a) does not preempt otherwise applicable 
nonbankruptcy laws that are concerned with protecting public 
health, safety, and welfare.”  Id. at 47.       
                                              
39 At oral argument, Insurers distinguished Midlantic on this 
basis.  Tr. of Oral Arg. at 76, Nov. 9, 2011.  But, as noted, 
prior practice was only one of three grounds for the Court’s 
decision.  Moreover, under the Insurers’ characterization of 
prior practice—one which, as discussed above, we regard as 
accurate in part—the logic the Court employed in Midlantic 
would control here as well. 
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(1934)).  Extending the well-established presumption against 
preemption of state police powers to § 1123(a) seems to 
balance these aims, and might also forestall some of the more 
problematic hypotheticals advanced by Insurers. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the anti-
assignment provisions in the relevant insurance policies are 
preempted by § 1123(a)(5)(B) to the extent they prohibit 
transfer to a § 524(g) trust.  We will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
